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Krithika Srinivasan & Alasdair Cochrane 
 
Justice, Conflict and Shared Vulnerabilities in a Multi-Species World    
 
In order to explore the possibility and shape of multi-species justice, we need to address 
questions about its scope. How far can justice be extended: to humans, to sentient animals, 
to all living organisms, to collectives such as species and ecosystems?  How can conflicting 
claims of justice between these entities be reconciled?  This paper explores various ways of 
delineating the scope of justice. It argues that traditional anthropocentric theories are 
untenable and that all sentient creatures possess certain enforceable claims. While a sole 
focus on sentient individuals can neglect the collectives which sustain individual flourishing, 
attempts to extend justice beyond individuals raise profound problems: first, they can at 
times have harmful implications for individuals; and second, as we show, ‘ecological justice’ 
can quickly collapse into the prioritisation of human over nonhuman interests. In order to 
begin a discussion of ways to overcome these limitations, the final section of the paper briefly 
sketches the possibility of grounding justice in ‘shared vulnerabilities’. This reorientation, we 
suggest, helps to avoid the filtering in of anthropocentrism into decision-making about 
common conflicts between nonhuman individuals and collectives.  
 
1. From Anthropocentric to Sentientist Justice 
 
Traditionally, most political theorists have thought that justice applies solely to human beings. 
David Hume (1975, 190), for example, writing on animals claimed that while we ought to ‘give 
gentle usage to these creatures’, we are not ‘under any restraint of justice with regard to 
them’. This anthropocentric understanding of justice has important implications for 
nonhuman nature, as it means that what is owed to nonhuman beings is dependent upon 
human interests and concerns, since only humans possess enforceable claims. Crucially, this 
anthropocentric framework is reflected in the legal and institutional structures of existing 
political communities.  
 
Two rationales are usually provided for reserving justice for humans. First is the idea that 
justice only applies between members of a ‘shared scheme of cooperation’ (Rawls 1999, 96). 
Since, on this view, nonhumans do not directly contribute to the common pool of social 
goods, they are not entitled to take from it. Second, theorists sometimes argue that justice 
requires some particular characteristic – like ‘moral personhood’ – which only humans are 
believed to possess (Garner 2004).  
 
These rationales are problematic on many counts. With respect to the criterion of social 
contribution, it is obvious that many nonhumans contribute to societal flourishing (Valentini 
2014; Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011). Moreover, there is good reason to doubt the relevance 
of social contribution for meriting justice. Human infants certainly possess entitlements of 
justice in spite of not visibly contributing to the common pool of resources in obvious ways. 
Furthermore, they possess such entitlements in spite of the fact that they might lack the 
characteristics of moral personhood.  
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In light of these shortcomings, theories have emerged (Nussbaum 2006; Donaldson and 
Kymlicka 2011; Garner 2013; Cochrane 2018) which claim that justice should be extended 
beyond humans to individual sentient nonhuman animals. Perhaps their most important 
claim is that justice should not be dependent upon any kind of social contribution or capacity, 
but rests on something much more basic: possession of ‘well-being’ – a life that can go well 
or badly for oneself. On this view, being a sentient being, a creature who is aware of 
themselves, who can feel the effects of others’ actions upon them – in short, a being who is 
a ‘subject-of-a-life’ (Regan 2004) – is sufficient for justice.  
 
2. From Ecological to Anthropocentric Justice 
 
Some thinkers have argued for the extension of justice beyond sentient creatures to include 
all living organisms, including plants (Taylor 1986). Others have argued that ‘collectives’, such 
as ‘species’, ‘population’, and ‘ecosystem’ ought to be considered subjects of justice (Baxter 
2004; Schlosberg 2007). These calls for ‘ecological justice’ make some sense. For one, no 
sentient animal is just a single solitary organism; rather there all sorts of bugs and bacteria 
who inhabit our bodies. More important, however, is the inextricable link between the 
wellbeing of sentient individuals and the health of other sentient and non-sentient life-forms. 
Living organisms and biophysical processes provide a whole range of ‘services’ that allow 
human and nonhuman individuals in multi-species communities to flourish (Schlosberg 2007).  
 
Indeed, Schlosberg (2007, 149) argues that simply extending justice to individual animals 
without recognising the importance of the flourishing of the systems in which they reside is 
not only counterproductive, but ‘atomizes nature’ and ‘devalues a form of life’. As such, we 
need to respect, recognize and acknowledge the claims of the system as a whole; this is also 
the only way in which we can do justice to the individuals who make it up.  
 
The extension of justice to ecological collectives however raises some important questions 
about the competing claims of all of these putative subjects of justice (see also Waldow and 
Scholsberg in this volume). One of the most discussed areas of conflict is that between 
nonhuman collectives and individuals. Specifically, a focus on the justice entitlements of the 
‘system’ can lead to significant harm to individuals. Such problems have been written about 
widely when initiatives that are meant to benefit ecological collectives harm people, for 
example, when human individuals and communities are displaced, and even killed, in the 
pursuit of biodiversity conservation (Duffy 2016). Similar conflicts emerge when there are 
competing justice claims between nonhuman individuals and collectives. Such conflicts are 
starkly evident in the domain of biodiversity conservation, since it is oriented towards the 
protection of nonhuman collectives.  
 
For instance, the negative justice effects of the focus on ecological collectives are obvious 
where individual sentient animals are exterminated in vast numbers for the sake of the 
‘ecosystem’, as is seen in efforts to manage invasive alien species such rabbits and cane toads 
in Australia, and grey squirrels and mink in Scotland. Less obvious, but equally troubling 
examples lie in zoos, and in captive breeding, de-extinction, trophy hunting and wildlife 
ranching programmes which subject individual animals to serious harms in order to safeguard 
or promote the flourishing of a larger collective such as a ‘species’ or a ‘population’.  
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Analyses of the everyday politics of conservation have shown that the valorization of 
collectives often serves the purpose of meeting human interests of one kind or the other 
(Srinivasan 2017), and thus tends to collapse back into anthropocentrism.  For instance, by 
prioritizing a larger collective over individual animals, trophy hunting for conservation allows 
for (human) recreational interests to be met even while seeming to fulfil obligations to 
nonhuman nature. Similarly, de-extinction or captive breeding programmes are ultimately 
about addressing the human desire to preserve certain animals for a certain type of aesthetic 
value; any ecological function that endangered wildlife may have had has usually disappeared 
following the habitat loss that usually accompanies their endangerment, while surviving 
individuals face highly compromised life-experiences.  
 
Indeed, this is becoming more evident with the recurrent failure of species reintroduction 
programmes: these animals are brought back into highly modified social and biophysical 
landscapes and face almost immediate persecution for the threats they pose to people 
(Lorimer et al. 2015; Doubleday 2018). Even if ecological functions are restored, the aim is 
almost always towards preserving a state of affairs that benefits humankind. The 
prioritization of human interests is also seen when it comes to dealing with invasive species: 
it is usually only those organisms that have negative impacts upon human economic, material 
or aesthetic interests that are targeted for control and extermination (Sagoff 2009).  
Creatures that have deleterious impacts on ‘native ecosystems’, but that serve some (human) 
interest, such as sheep in New Zealand, are never subject to such eradication. In effect, when 
nonhuman individuals are harmed in the name of the flourishing of nonhuman collectives, it 
is often the case that human interests are at play.  
 
3. Grounding Justice in Shared Vulnerabilities? 
 
How can these issues be navigated? Is it possible to extend justice beyond humans, recognise 
the importance of collectives to individual flourishing, whilst neither losing sight of the value 
of individuals, nor collapsing into anthropocentrism?  
 
One possible pathway to negotiate these competing justice claims lies in the concept of 
‘shared vulnerabilities’ (Derrida 2008; Plumwood 2002). This concept highlights the 
vulnerability that is inherent in being a living entity on this planet - one that cuts across all 
organisms, human and nonhuman (Srinivasan and Kasturirangan 2016). This shift in attention 
to our shared state of vulnerability foregrounds questions relating to how the risks of living 
on this Earth are distributed within and across our multispecies communities. Humans are 
one among many creatures who inhabit this planet, and we share with nonhuman others 
certain risks and vulnerabilities that underpin our embodied existence.  
 
Justice, in the simplest sense, is about ensuring equity in how ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ are 
distributed. Insofar as the idea of shared vulnerabilities refocuses attention on ‘bads’, and 
specifically, who is harmed and how, it can offer fresh insights on how to navigate justice 
conflicts. These can be illustrated by returning to the example of conservation and showing 
how starting from our shared vulnerabilities problematizes common decision-making in this 
area.  
 
In Celermajer, D., Chatterjee, S., Cochrane, A. et al. Justice Through a Multispecies 
Lens. Contemp Polit Theory (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-020-00386-5 
4 
 
If we revisit the examples discussed above with renewed focus on the different and unequal 
harms faced by various members of our multispecies communities (and not only any positive 
gain or ‘goods’, such as species preservation) the calculus through which individual organisms 
are sacrificed in the name of the collective radically changes. For instance, the (human) 
interest in preserving the panda as a species would not trump the lived experiences of 
individual pandas. The extreme vulnerabilities of individual pandas in captive reproduction 
programmes would raise the questions of why and whether they should disproportionately 
bear the harms of species preservation efforts that try to mitigate human-caused ecological 
harm and loss.   
 
This approach radically alters how different interests are balanced when attempting to do 
justice to all. For example, the anthropocentric classification of particular species as invasive 
or vermin that need eradication would not be automatically privileged over the fundamental 
harms that individual members of these species experience as a result of these classifications. 
So, for example, if red squirrels in Scotland are vulnerable and need protection, then this 
would not entail eradicating grey squirrels, but rather require preventing those human 
activities that erode red squirrel habitat and endanger them in the first place. Overall, the 
framework of shared vulnerabilities complicates the implicit prioritization of human interests 
(or, specifically, the interests of privileged humans) that often (but not always) colours 
conservation practice. 
 
By flagging that human beings are one kind of life-form among many, the notion of shared 
vulnerabilities, also challenges the assumption that humankind somehow knows what is 
‘right’ and ‘best’ ecologically (see also Chaterjee and Neimanis, this volume). Conservation 
actions that harm individual organisms to protect the collective rest on the premise that 
humankind can fully understand, predict and control how the rest of the world works. Human 
history, and in particular, the history of environmental problems, shows that knowledge is 
always incomplete and fallible (Harari 2014). The framework of shared vulnerabilities reminds 
us that humans are part of nature, as opposed to having special oversight, knowledge, and 
control. Qualifying human hubris means that actions which cause harm to vulnerable others 
in the name of doing ecological ‘good’ become far more difficult to justify; it also generates 
an approach based on greater respect for the agency of the rest of nature, as exemplified by 
rewilding initiatives that relinquish control.   
 
The framework of shared vulnerabilities does not provide a detailed roadmap outlining how 
the various claims of members of multispecies communities ought to be balanced. Instead, it 
offers a reorientation of approach: one that urges critical attention to who is harmed and 
how. This reorientation offers a way of overcoming the implicit anthropocentrism that often 
shapes how we think of nonhuman wellbeing, especially in the context of conflicts between 
nonhuman individuals and collectives. This approach thus calls for engagement with these 
problems in a manner that is attentive to the subtle ways in which human interests enter 
decisions about justice trade-offs among nonhumans, that do not a priori privilege human 
interests or human knowledge, and that foreground questions of harm. It calls upon us to 
experiment with social and political institutions which see humans as just one creature 
amongst many, living in multi-species communities of shared vulnerability.  
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